


THE COLONEL ROBERT D. HEINL, JR.
1982 MEMORIAL AWARD
IN MARINE CORPS HISTORY

*Texts of the Winning Article and Those
Receiving Honorable Mentions*



History and Museums Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.

The drawing by Richard A. Hillman on the cover is derived from a portrait photograph of the late Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr., USMC (Ret), for whom the annual award is named. A prolific writer and historian, Colonel Heintz served in the Marine Corps from 1937 to 1963, participating in both World War II and the Korean War.

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1982

Preface

This pamphlet reprints with the permission of the original publishers the article which won the 1982 Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr. Memorial Award in Marine Corps History and those which gained honorable mentions in the competition.

The co-winners of the 1982 award, Mr. Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas, each received a bronzed plaque and a check for \$250. Honorable mention certificates were awarded Colonel John J. Grace, USMC (Ret), Col James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret), Mr. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., and Dr. Frank J. Olynyk.

The awards jury consisted of Brigadier General Frederick P. Henderson, USMC (Ret), Mr. J. Robert Moskin, and Colonel Allan R. Millett, USMCR. All are charter members of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. General Henderson, since retirement after a distinguished Marine Corps career, has pursued an equally distinguished career as a military analyst. Mr. Moskin, former foreign editor of *Look* magazine and presently senior editor with Aspen Institute, is the author of the highly regarded *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* as well as other books. Colonel Millett is a professor of history at Ohio State University and, in addition to numerous academic publications, is the author of the acclaimed history of the Marine Corps, *Semper Fidelis*.

This award is an annual one given for the best article pertinent to Marine Corps history published in a given year. The award commemorates Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr., the distinguished Marine Corps officer, journalist, and historian who died in May 1979. Probably the best known of his many published works is his history of the Marine Corps, *Soldiers of the Sea*. He was a founder of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation, the presenter of the award.

The winner of the 1981 award, which was the first, was Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. "Skip" Bartlett, USMC, for his article, "Ouster of a Commandant," in the November 1980 issue of the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*.

Four honorable mentions also were named:

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Krulak, USMCR, for his "The U.S. Marine Corps; Strategy for the Future," *Naval Review* 1980.

Dr. Alfred J. Marini, for "Political Perceptions of the Marine Forces: Great Britain, 1699, 1739, and the United States, 1798, 1804," *Military Affairs*, December 1980.

First Lieutenant Joseph R. Owens, USMC (Ret), for "Chosin Reservoir Remembered," *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1980.

Dr. Eugene B. Sledge, for "Peleliu: A Neglected Battle," *Marine Corps Gazette* (three parts), November 1979, December 1979, January 1980.

The Heintz Award was made possible by gifts to the Marine Corps Historical Foundation for that purpose. Continuation of the award program is dependent upon further donations to the fund. Persons desiring to contribute should write to the Heintz Memorial Award Fund, Marine Corps Historical Foundation, Building 58, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374.



E. H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Table of Contents

Preface	iii
---------------	-----

1982 HEINL AWARD WINNER

“Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Sea-Going Mission”

Marine Corps Gazette, November 1981

Jack Shulimson and Dr. Graham A. Cosmas	1
---	---

1982 HONORABLE MENTIONS

“Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission”

Naval Review 1981

Colonel John J. Grace, USMC (Ret)	11
---	----

“Lejeune of the Naval Service”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1981

Colonel James W. Hammond, Jr., USMC (Ret)	31
---	----

“Two Jima”

American Heritage, June/July 1981

Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.	37
----------------------------	----

“New Research Could Alter Aces List”

Fortitudine, Summer 1981

Dr. Frank J. Olynyk	49
---------------------------	----

Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps' Sea-Going Mission

by Jack Shulimson and Graham A. Cosmas

Seagoing Marines owed their salvation at least as much to the cross-purposes of their enemies as to the efforts of their friends.




1982
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President Theodore Roosevelt's attempt in November 1908 to remove Marine guards from the warships of the U.S. Navy resulted in a noisy congressional and public controversy. This episode is often depicted as a simple melodrama in which Marines heroically and effectively rose to save their Corps from a cabal of naval officers bent on its destruction. In fact, the issues were more complex and were related to the effort to redefine Marine Corps roles and missions in the 20th century steam-and-steel Navy. In the larger context, the controversy illustrates both the complex bureaucratic infighting that shaped so much of Progressive Era reform and the growing estrangement between the lame-duck Roosevelt and the Old Guard Republican congressional leadership.

In November 1908, the Marine Corps consisted of 267 officers and 9,100 enlisted men. Approximately one-third of this force was stationed afloat, mostly as guard detachments on warships. Another third was on shore duty outside the continental United States with the largest contingent in the Philippines. The remaining third served within the United States as navy yard guards and constituted a reserve from which expeditionary forces could be organized. Since the Spanish-American War, Marine Corps strength had expanded three-fold. In the latest increase, in 1908, Congress had added almost 800 officers and men and had advanced the Commandant of the Corps to the rank of major general.

While operating under the Navy Department, the Marine Corps enjoyed the legal status of a separate Service. Its staff in Washington, headed by the Commandant, was closely allied with the powerful Navy Department bureaus and had a reputation for skillful and effective congressional lobbying. Despite this reputation, Headquarters Marine Corps, in the words of one Marine officer, was "not altogether a happy family." Major General Commandant George F. Elliott, known for his blunt and often hasty speech, was partially deaf and rumored to be overly fond of the bottle. His staff was riddled with intrigue as am-



USS Virginia, June 1908.

Courtesy Naval Institute Proceedings



Marines aboard USS Brooklyn at turn of century.

bitious, politically-connected officers pursued their own bureaucratic aggrandizement. Field Marines often regarded the Washington staff with suspicion. LtCol John A. Lejeune denounced "the politicians stationed at Headquarters" and declared, "Fortunately the real Marine Corps is elsewhere and consists of the 10,000 officers and men who are scattered around the world."

Within the Navy, sharp divisions had emerged between the so-called progressive reformers and the largely conservative bureau chiefs. The reformers, mostly young commanders and captains, favored establishing a Navy general staff, modeled on that recently created for the Army. President Roosevelt generally sympathized with the reformers and had as his personal naval aide one of the most aggressive of them, Cdr William S. Sims, yet the reformers usually met frustration at the hands of the bureau chiefs who enjoyed strong congressional support. The reformers generally viewed the Marine Corps, or at least its Washington headquarters, which usually sided with the bureau chiefs, as an obstacle to their plans. One of the more vociferous Navy progressives, Cdr William F. Fullam, claimed that "the Marines and the bureau system are twins. Both must go before our Navy . . . can be properly prepared for war."

Since the early 1890s, Fullam had been in the forefront of a movement among naval officers to take Marine guard detachments off the Navy's fighting ships. Fullam and his cohorts especially objected to the use of Marines as ships' policemen, on the grounds that it was an anachronistic holdover from the days of the press gang and was detrimental to the training, discipline, and status of the modern bluejacket.

The Fullamites envisioned a new mission for the Marine Corps within the Navy, once the Corps was freed from its obsolete tasks and was properly organized. The reformers urged that the Marines be formed into permanent battalions and given their own transports, so that they could accompany the fleet either as an expeditionary force or to seize and fortify advance bases. While many Marine officers eagerly embraced the advance base mission, all Marines insisted that the ships' guards be retained. They claimed that service on board warships kept Marines in close day-to-day association with the Navy and provided them with many of the skills needed for expeditionary and advance base duty. By 1908, Fullam's position had gained many adherents among Navy line officers, but Headquarters Marine Corps, with its allies in Congress and



Roosevelt sympathized with reformers.

the bureaus had defeated repeated efforts to remove the detachments from capital ships.

By mid-1908, naval reform was in the air. The reformers proposed to a sympathetic President Roosevelt the formation of an independent civilian-military commission to study Navy Department reorganization, specifically the breakup of the bureau system. As key instigators of the commission proposal, Fullam, in command of the Navy training station at Newport, and Cdr Sims tried to use Sims' influence with the President to have the Marines removed from ships. Fullam saw success on the Marine question as "an entering wedge" to break the power of the bureaus. "No legislation and no Congressional action are needed," he told Sims, "but it prepares the way for the new gospel—that the men and officers who go to sea and make the ship, the Navy, efficient must control."

On 16 September, Sims, in a long memorandum to the President, outlined the case against the Marines. He reviewed the 20-year history of the issue, emphasizing Fullam's arguments that the use of Marines as ships' policemen undermined the discipline and morale of the blue-jackets. Sims cited the fact that the Bureau of Navigation had twice recommended the removal of the Marines, but that "General Elliott goes to the Secretary and successfully combats the proposition." Sims urged Roosevelt to cut through this political tangle by using his executive authority to order the Marines off the ships. He stated: "The effect of removing the Marines from the ships would be electrical, because the demand is universal."

MajGen Cmdt Elliott was not informed.



Besides Sims, Fullam used a number of other formal and informal channels to reach the President and Secretary of the Navy. On 31 August, W.D. Walker, editor of *Army and Navy Life* and a close associate of the naval reformers, urged Roosevelt to remove the Marine guards, employing essentially the same arguments as Fullam and Sims. More important, a close Fullam associate, Cdr William R. Shoemaker, in the Bureau of Navigation, convinced the bureau chief, RAdm John E. Pillsbury, to revive the Bureau's earlier removal recommendation. On 16 October, Pillsbury wrote to Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf that "the time has arrived when all marine detachments should be removed from . . . naval vessels." Secretary Metcalf brought up the proposal at a Cabinet meeting, and President Roosevelt approved it. On 23 October, Metcalf formally concurred in Pillsbury's recommendation and directed that it be carried out.

Up to this point, all those involved in making the decision had carefully avoided consulting or informing Gen Elliott. Elliott, however, had received hints that the Marines' shipboard position again was under attack. Earlier in October, Adm Pillsbury had issued an order reducing the size of the Marine guard on one of the battleships. Although Elliott had persuaded Metcalf to rescind this order, he realized that the struggle was far from over. On 30 October, he discussed the issue with Sims and stated that he planned to ask Roosevelt directly to "have the pressure stopped." Before Elliott could meet with the President, however, Secretary Metcalf informed the Commandant that the Marines were to come off the ships. Elliott at once counterattacked. After an unsatisfactory

meeting with Adm Pillsbury, Elliott, on 7 November, made a final appeal to Metcalf. He presented the Secretary a long memorandum, prepared by his staff, which declared that:

the proposed removal of Marines from vessels of the Navy is . . . contrary to the long established and uninterrupted custom of the service, contrary to all precedents and rulings . . . contrary to the wishes of Congress, and is based upon no argument which is cogent or potent.

Metcalf rejected the Marine plea and informed the Commandant that the President already had decided on removal. Elliott then requested permission to take his case directly to Roosevelt.

On 9 November, in his meeting with the President, Elliott found Roosevelt sympathetic to the Marines but firmly committed to their removal. In the course of the conversation, Elliott emphasized that many Marine officers viewed abolition of the ships' guards as the "death knell" of the Corps. Roosevelt asked whether Elliott shared this opinion. Candidly, the Commandant replied that he did not. Roosevelt then instructed the general to draw up a statement of the Marine Corps mission once the guards were removed from the ships.

Elliott entrusted the preparation of the proposed order to three officers of his personal staff: LtCol James Mahoney, LtCol Eli K. Cole, and Maj Charles G. Long. All three were Naval Academy graduates who had been closely associated with the emerging advance base mission. Their draft order avoided mention of the ships' guards and provided that Marines were to garrison navy yards and naval stations within and beyond the continental limits of the United States. Marines were to "furnish the first line of . . . mobile defense" for overseas naval stations, and they were to help man the fortifications of such bases. The Corps was to garrison the Panama Canal Zone and furnish other such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as necessary. In an enclosure to the memorandum, the three officers recommended organization of the Marine Corps, once the ships' guards were withdrawn, into 9 permanent 1,100-man regiments. Elliott and his staff obviously were making a virtue out of necessity by trying to stake a firm claim to the advance base and expeditionary role, as well as making an expandable expeditionary organization, while conceding the loss of the ships' detachments.

On 12 November, President Roosevelt incorporated the exact wording of Elliott's memorandum in his executive order. The order did

not mention ships' guards or call for their removal, although all those concerned understood that to be its intent. During the next several months, the Bureau of Navigation gradually began the removal of the ships' detachments. By early 1909 about 800 of the 2,700 ships' guards had come off.

The immediate reaction to the executive order was predictable. Naval officers generally approved. Upon hearing the news of Roosevelt's decision, Fullam exclaimed: "Hurrah for the President! God Bless him!" and compared the executive order to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation.

Marine officers looked upon the executive order with misgivings at best, and most saw it as a first step toward the elimination of their Corps. One Marine officer stated: "The President's order . . . in effect reduces the Marine Corps to the status of watchmen." Rumors circulated in Washington that Marine officers were organizing to lobby Congress for reversal of Roosevelt's decision. Despite the unhappiness among his officers, Gen Elliott loyally supported the executive order in public, claiming that it would be "the making of the Marine Corps." On 16 November, in response to the reported Marine lobbying efforts, Elliott issued a special order forbidding such activity as "contrary to the motto of the Corps—for 'Semper Fidelis' would be but a meaningless term if it shone only on the sunny side of life or duty."



MajGen Leonard Wood, USA, wanted Marines in the Army.

Even as Elliott publicly looked toward a new role for the Marine Corps within the Navy, MajGen Leonard Wood, a confidant of Roosevelt and a leading Army progressive, saw the removal of Marines from ships as an opportunity to incorporate the Corps into the Army. Wood and most other senior Army officers were looking for a way to expand the Army's infantry. The Marine Corps had a prominent place in Army proposals for achieving this ob-

jective. During 1907, the Army Chief of Staff, LtGen J. Franklin Bell, floated as a trial balloon a plan to transfer the Army's large coast artillery corps to the Navy (and incorporate it in the Marine Corps). This would leave room in the Army for more infantry regiments. Wood, then commanding general, Division of the Philippines, offered as a counterproposal the simple incorporation of the Marines into the Army. Wood, who had a wide circle of acquaintances within the Navy and Marine Corps, respected Marine military efficiency but had gained the impression that the Navy no longer needed the Corps. Late in 1907, he wrote in a letter intended for Roosevelt's eye that the Marine Corps:

is an able body, but its desire for enlargement is productive of unrest. A large portion of the navy are in favor of dispensing with Marines on board ship, . . . their numbers are . . . far in excess of the actual needs of the navy. We need them in the army . . .

Neither of these plans had gone beyond the talking stage when Roosevelt's executive order reopened the entire issue of the Marines' future. Wood had just returned to the United States to take over the Department of the East. He was already regarded as the leading candidate to succeed Bell as Army Chief of Staff. At Roosevelt's invitation, Wood spent several days in mid-November as a house guest at the Executive Mansion. During this visit, Wood pressed upon Roosevelt his view that the Marines should be incorporated into the Army. He argued that Elliott, through the executive order, was aiming to establish an expanded Marine infantry under the Navy Department. Wood pointed out that the President, under his executive authority, could order the Marines to duty with the Army, as had been done temporarily several times in the past. Having established such a *fait accompli*, Roosevelt at a later time could work out with Congress and the Service Departments the legal details of the transfer. Roosevelt was receptive to Wood's proposal. Already irritated with Marine lobbying, he told his military aide, Capt Archie Butt, that the Marines "should be absorbed into the Army, and no vestige of their organization should be allowed to remain."

While in Washington, Wood informally discussed his ideas with Gen Bell and other high-ranking Army officers. He also made an ill-fated overture to two key Marine Corps staff officers, Col Frank L. Denny and LtCol Charles L. McCawley. Both officers were well known in Washington social circles, and both had strong political connections. Denny, the

son of a prominent Indiana Republican, had many Army acquaintances and nursed ambitions to become Commandant of the Marine Corps. McCawley was the son of a former Commandant and had been the military social aide to Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt. In a chance encounter with the two men on the street in front of the White House, Wood told them that he personally favored transfer of the Marine Corps to the Army and confided that the President was inclined to such a course of action. He asked Denny and McCawley to sound out Marine officer sentiment.

On 23 November, Denny and McCawley told the Commandant, who had just returned to Washington, about the proposed merger with the Army and the President's tentative support for the idea. Much to their surprise, Gen Elliott angrily denounced such a move. In a letter of protest to Gen Wood, Elliott claimed that neither he nor the Secretary of the Navy had been told of this proposal and declared: "I would as soon believe there was a lost chord in Heaven" as to believe the President, after redefining the Corps' mission, would contemplate separating the Marines from the Navy. Replying to Elliott, Wood reiterated his own support for Army-Marine amalgamation but denied that he spoke for the President.

In a further exchange of letters, Elliott declared that Wood, as an Army general, had no right to discuss disposition of the Marine Corps, which was a separate Service. The Commandant insisted that "the entire Army and Marine Corps, with the exception of the general officers, would be bitterly opposed to such amalgamation." Wood apologized to Roosevelt for bringing his name into the discussion and forwarded all his correspondence on the subject. On 28 November, Roosevelt, in a letter addressed "Dear Leonard," committed himself on the amalgamation issue. He wrote, "You are quite welcome to quote me on that matter. I think the Marines should be incorporated with the Army." Wood on 2 December flatly informed Elliott that the President supported the transfer. The entire incident convinced Elliott, who up to now had publicly defended removal of the Marine guards, that he and the Marine Corps were being double-crossed. As he later stated, "While we had been following quietly our duties, elimination and absorption were casting unknown to us their shadows at our heels."

Elliott was among the last to learn about Wood's scheme. Almost as soon as Wood had arrived in Washington, the future of the

Marine Corps had become a matter of public and private speculation. Fairly accurate accounts of Wood's proposals and Roosevelt's reaction appeared in newspapers and journals. While few Marines expressed any enthusiasm about going into the Army, many thought such a course of action inevitable as a result of the removal of ships' guards. In an extreme expression of this point of view, one officer declared: "It is imperative that we immediately sever every possible connection with the Navy by transfer to some branch of the Army . . ."

The regular House Naval Affairs Committee hearings on the annual Navy Department appropriation provided the scene for the first political skirmish over both removal of the Marine detachments and the merger of the Marines with the Army. On 9 December, in his testimony, Adm Pillsbury flatly stated the Navy Department position: "I think that it will be a very great mistake to put them [the Marines] in the Army. We want them in the Navy. We do not want them on board ship." Although the Marine officers, including Gen Elliott, made no mention of the subject in their public testimony, Elliott informed the committee off the record that he now opposed removal of the ships' detachments. In perhaps the shrewdest maneuver of the hearing, LtCol George E. Richards, assistant paymaster of the Corps, responding to a prearranged question from a committee member, presented a memorandum estimating that it would cost the Navy Department an additional \$425,000 to replace Marines with sailors on board ships. At the end of the session, the committee voted to hold supplementary hearings by a subcommittee on the entire Marine issue.

In the period between the conclusion of the full House committee hearings in December and the opening of the subcommittee hearings in January, the Marine Corps and its allies mobilized for the struggle. Marine staff officers prepared several detailed memoranda supporting their position. On 20 December, a group of Marine officers from several east coast navy yards met privately at Boston to discuss "the new status of the Marine Corps." While they publicly denied that their meeting had anything to do with attempts to reverse the President's executive order, few observers believed they met for any other purpose. Sims and Fullam exchanged rumors and warnings about the Marines' organizing and lobbying efforts. The Army question, meanwhile, faded into the background. Although Wood continued to discuss the subject privately, neither

he nor Roosevelt took any overt action. They and the War Department were apparently unwilling to challenge directly Navy control of the Marines if the Navy wanted to retain the Corps.

When the subcommittee began its hearings on 9 January 1909, it was obvious that pro-Marine forces were in control. Representative Thomas H. Butler, who presided over most of the sessions, had a son in the Marine Corps and was on the record as opposing Roosevelt's executive order. The clerk of the subcommittee was a former Marine officer. Gen Elliott and his staff attended almost the entire hearing, and the subcommittee permitted them to cross-examine witnesses. Cdr Fullam described the atmosphere of the proceedings: "The Marine colonels were ever present. A stranger could not have distinguished them from members of the Committee. They rose at will to exhort, object, and cross-examine." Although one-sided, Fullam's observations were in the main correct. He and the other reformers faced a rigged jury and a hanging judge.

Before the hearings ended on 15 January, a parade of 34 witnesses testified. All of the Marines opposed withdrawal of the guard detachments from ships, while the Navy officers split evenly for and against. Both sides reiterated their traditional arguments for and against keeping Marines on warships. Using rudimentary cost-effectiveness analysis, they presented conflicting estimates of the expense involved in replacing Marines with sailors.

While the subcommittee focused on the cost issue, the question of transferring the Marine Corps to the Army was never far from the surface. Several Marine and Navy opponents of the executive order warned that removal of the guard detachments might lead to the Navy losing the Marine Corps, while supporters of the order affirmed their desire to keep the Marines in the Navy. Fullam, for example, declared: "If I were king here tomorrow, I would preserve the Marine Corps . . . as a splendidly organized mobile force, to serve with the Navy . . ." Secretary Newberry testified that if it were a choice between losing the Marines and putting them back on ship, "I would rather put them back aboard ship." The prospect of absorption of the Marines by the Army was also a stumbling block to congressional supporters of Roosevelt. Representative John W. Weeks, wrote to Fullam: "My mind now inclines to leave in the hands of the Executive the question of where the Marines shall serve, but takes a positive stand against action which


will tend to amalgamate the Corps with the Army.

When the full Naval Affairs Committee reported the naval appropriation bill to the House on 16 January, it was clear that the Marine point of view had prevailed. The committee recommended insertion in the bill of a provision that:

hereafter officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps shall serve . . . on board all battleships and armored cruisers, . . . in detachments of not less than eight per centum of the strength of the enlisted men of the Navy on said vessels.

When the appropriation bill came up for consideration before the House, administration forces, assisted by vigorous Navy Department and White House lobbying, turned the tables on the Marines. On 21 January the House passed the bill without the proposed amendment to keep Marines on board ships.


The fight now shifted to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, where the Marine Corps could depend on the support of the powerful chairman, Senator Eugene Hale of Maine. Hale, a staunch Roosevelt opponent, was at loggerheads with the President over Navy Department reorganization in general and specifically had come out against taking the



Marines off ships. Without bothering to hold hearings on the question of Marine removal, Hale's committee on 10 February reported the appropriation bill to the Senate with numerous amendments, including reinsertion of the House committee's original provision overturning Roosevelt's executive order.

On the Senate floor, the administration made a major effort to defeat the amendment. Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a

personal friend of Roosevelt and long-time supporter of a big Navy, led the fight, liberally supplied with argument and documents by Sims and Fullam. During the Senate debate on 16 and 17 February, Lodge restated the reformers' arguments about the need to restructure the Marine Corps, but significantly disavowed any intention to put the Marines into the Army and stated that he himself would oppose any such effort. Senator Hale, on the other hand, kept hammering at the point that Congress had equal authority with the President over the Navy Department and warned that "the underlying purpose [of removal] is to take these people away from the navy and in the end turn them over to the army." When the amendment came up for final approval on the 17th, it passed by a vote of 51 to 12. This result reflected more personal and political hostility to Roosevelt than conviction about the status of the Marine Corps. Among the supporters of the amendment were most of the Democrats and a strong contingent of conservative Republicans. All of the opponents of the amendment were either Roosevelt loyalists, such as Lodge, or Republican progressives, including William E. Borah and Robert M. LaFollette.



Senator Borah

Senator LaFollette

After Senate passage of the entire bill on the 17th, the legislation went to a conference committee headed by Senator Hale and Representative George E. Foss, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. As part of the complex bargaining over dozens of amendments,

the House initially refused to accept the Senate provision on the Marines. Roosevelt, however, now was willing to surrender on the Marine issue in order to obtain favorable consideration on the other naval issues. On 18 February, he wrote to Representative Foss: "The bill as it passed the Senate will, as regards this point, do a little damage [but] it does not do very much." Roosevelt made no mention of putting the Marines in the Army and declared that he had issued his executive order "with the explicit object of retaining the marines for the purpose of an expeditionary force . . ." With this signal from the President, the House conferees gave way on the Marine issue. On 1 March, both houses passed the naval appropriation bill with the amendment requiring return of the Marine guards to the ships of the fleet.

During the remaining days of his administration, Roosevelt and Secretary Newberry attempted to find loopholes in the language of the appropriation act which would permit the President to keep the Marines off the ships. Newberry declared: "I have issued no orders about the return of Marines to the ships and will not do so."

The new President, William Howard Taft, was not about to challenge Congress and immediately took steps to reverse Roosevelt's final measures. As early as 25 January, the President-elect had taken a conciliatory tone, writing to Senator Hale:

I intend, so far as possible, to do nothing without full consultation with you managers of the Senate, and while of course it is not expected that we may always agree, it may be asserted that we shall never surprise each other.

On 5 April, Taft's Attorney General, at the Navy Department's request, declared that in his opinion the Congressional requirement that Marines make up eight percent of a ship's crew was constitutional. Very soon thereafter, Marines began marching up the gangplanks of Navy warships, and the controversy was over.

The participants reacted predictably to the outcome. For the Army, it was a case of very little ventured and nothing gained, since Wood's negotiations had been entirely confidential and informal, although quite serious in intent. Some Army officers, nevertheless, believed that "a great opportunity has been lost by the restoration of the Marines to the ships." Navy reformers such as Fullam railed against the decision, denouncing the "parlor and club colonels" of the Marine Corps and grumbling that the entire Navy was "at the mercy of the shore-staying staff and their political friends." More moderate reformers,

*RAdm Luce
issued a
warning.*



Courtesy Naval Institute Proceedings.

for example the respected RAdm Stephen B. Luce, founder of the Navy War College, warned that withdrawal of the ships' guards would have led to the "obliteration" of the Marine Corps. Taking Luce's lead, the Navy's General Board in later years would refuse to support the Fullamites in their agitation for removal of the Marine guards on the grounds that such action would lead to the loss of the Corps to the Army. Marines breathed a sigh of relief over what they considered their narrow escape and would cling ever more tenaciously to what was in effect a relatively minor mission. They viewed Fullam and his henchmen with suspicion and often outright hostility and believed they were continually vulnerable to power grabs by ambitious Army and Navy officers. On the occasion of renewed agitation by Fullam in 1913, Maj Smedley D. Butler exploded in a letter to his Quaker father, Representative Thomas Butler, who had chaired the special subcommittee in 1909: "I wish somebody would beat the S.O.B. to death. Please try to help us, Father," he pleaded, "for the Lord only knows what will become of our little Corps."



An agitated Maj Butler wrote to his father.

Despite Butler's alone-against-the-world outlook, the Marines in 1908-1909 owed their success against Roosevelt's executive order only partially to their own political action. The Marine Corps approached the removal issue with divided councils. Gen Elliott, obviously influenced by the advance base-oriented members of his informal staff, initially tried to trade acquiescence in the removal of the detachments for a reinforced and expanded Corps designed around the advance base and expeditionary missions. There was much justice in the accusation, made by both Adm Luce and Gen Wood, that the Major General Commandant was trying to take advantage of Roosevelt's order to establish an army of his own. Probably a majority of Marine officers in the field, as well as key members of the Headquarters staff, adamantly opposed removal of the guards from the beginning. Still other Marines, typified by Denny and McCawley, simply sought to turn the situation to their own personal advantage and flirted, more or less seriously, with amalgamation into the Army. Whether Elliott was simply swayed by the conflicting currents within the Corps or acting from firm conviction is not entirely clear from the evidence. What is certain is that he swung into active opposition to removal of the Marine guards only after becoming convinced that the President had betrayed him.

President Roosevelt did a great deal to frustrate his own order by, in effect, doublecrossing both the Marine Corps and the Navy reformers through his dealings with Wood. Even these factors and the Marine lobbying would not have been enough to reverse Roosevelt's order, had it not been for the general anti-Roosevelt hostility of the conservative Republican Senate leadership and the particular enmity of Senator Hale for all manifestations of naval reform. Taft's retreat from Roosevelt's policy toward the Marines foreshadowed the new President's gradual drift into alliance with the conservative faction of the Republican party. In the end, then, the ships' detachments owed their salvation at least as much to the cross-purposes of their enemies as to the efforts of their friends. Perhaps a newspaper's amateur poet had the last word:

The guard they stood at attention,
Like they didn't give a damn,
to hear the word of the Overlord,
The original great I am.
And he tells us that we ain't wanted,
That the jackies will go it alone.
But I thought I heard an under word
From a power behind the throne.

USMC

Land the Landing Force Where It Will Do the Most Good: A New Look at an Old Mission

by Colonel J. J. Grace, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)



1982
Honorable
Mention

The enemy commander knows the amphibious force is out there, far beyond the horizon. What he doesn't know is if the amphibious force commander will launch an assault. If he does launch, where will he strike? When? Those are some of the problems amphibious forces can pose for enemy commanders.

But under modern conditions, to cause those problems they will need modern ships, modern helicopters, and modern landing craft. Until these arrive in the force in sufficient numbers, amphibious commanders will have to approximate the new tactics as best they can with the old ships, the old helicopters, and the old landing craft.

Opposite, we see some of what we have, the Coronado (LPD 11) and Portland (LSD 37), just after they have completed their run in from sea and launched their 8-knot LVTPs not far off the North Carolina coast, about two years ago.

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The words "amphibious assault" conjure up an image of transports anchored a few miles offshore, disembarking their troops into landing craft and amphibian vehicles. These small craft form up in a series of assault waves and head toward a beach like that at Iwo Jima. At the water's edge the troops leave the craft and hurl themselves at an entrenched enemy who pours direct fire on the assault waves from positions seemingly impervious to the invaders' supporting arms.

Is there any connection between this notion of a bloody assault against a defended beach and the picture of an XM-1 tank easing down the bow ramp of a C-5A transport aircraft? Does the idea of a fuel truck being driven off a roll-on, roll-off merchant ship moored to a pier have anything to do with the scene of a cluttered beach in Normandy on 7 June 1944? Recent events near the Persian Gulf impel us to consider such questions, for they have made us vitally concerned with the ways by which we can project U. S. combat power overseas.


In last year's *Naval Review*, Bing West explained the Carter Administration's Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) as follows: ". . . this concept neither requires nor provides an assault capability on the part of our amphibious forces. Maritime prepositioning can be staged in commercial ships . . . for administrative landings at perhaps one-half the cost of building assault ships of equal lift. . . . Assault shipping is intended for the recapture of territory or the outflanking of an enemy after war has begun. Maritime prepositioning is intended to prevent the loss of the territory and to deter the aggression in the first place. If forced by budgets to choose, maritime prepositioning should be developed, even at the expense of assault shipping."¹

In the same issue Bill Krulak argued that, rather than accepting the amphibious mission as its sole reason for existence, the Marine Corps should shift its focus to the RDF mission as a broader and more supportable basis for its institutional identity in the future.² Both of these essays illustrate a long-standing mind set of many civilian commentators and managers within the Department of Defense in which the forces of the marketplace are counted on to influence decisions on the efficient allocation of resources.

Amphibious warfare, which is on the margin between naval and land warfare, has almost always suffered from a lack of interest in

¹For footnotes, please turn to page 131.





J. J. Grace

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both the Army and the Navy. And certainly the Air Force gives it little thought. One result of this neglect by the major services is that civilian policymakers who, at best, have a confused and incomplete picture of amphibious warfare, are inclined to dismiss the subject as an anachronism that survives only because it is the sole *raison d'être* of the Marine Corps, itself an organizational anomaly.

Conventional Wisdom

The Department of Defense has long assumed that the most demanding military task faced by the United States is the defense of Western Europe against an onslaught by Warsaw Pact forces. The principal role of naval forces in this scenario is the defense of shipping crossing the North Atlantic. These ships must sail safely, so the logic goes, in order for reinforcements to reach the land and air forces on the continent if a conflict lasts longer than a few weeks without escalating to a general nuclear war. The scenario is reminiscent of the European campaign in 1944-1945 except for the absence of any large-scale amphibious operations or, for that matter, major counteroffensives of any kind. But then, before Dunkirk, military planners in Europe anticipated no need for amphibious operations or, on the part of the Allies, for major offensive campaigns either.

As we know it, amphibious warfare was conceived and developed in response to the anticipated needs of our naval forces in a conflict with Japan across the Pacific. Given the location of areas of vital interest to the United States (the Philippines and the East Indies), and the capabilities of the ships and aircraft of the period, the success of a naval campaign (which in turn was a necessary precondition for any subsequent

land or air campaigns) depended on the possession of advanced bases. If such bases were held by the enemy, they had to be seized. If they did not exist, they had to be built. These geographic and operational aspects of the Pacific campaign had a significant effect on the tactics and logistics of amphibious warfare.

The ports and airfields needed to support the offensive across thousands of miles of open ocean were located on various small islands. Though the islands could be isolated from enemy reinforcements by naval operations, they offered few places for getting a landing force ashore. Once ashore the landing force had even fewer opportunities for maneuver. The rough, restricted terrain inland provided good defensive positions which the enemy fortified heavily. The inevitable tactical response to these conditions was a frontal assault by Marine and Army infantry.

Not only were the ports and airfields throughout the Pacific few in number, but they were also underdeveloped for their intended use. This led to the creation within the fleet of an ability to construct expeditionary base facilities rapidly. The Seabees who did this became famous for their ability to improve airfields and clear ports while the fighting still raged ashore. And they built new facilities where before nothing had existed but palm trees and coral.

The combination of these advanced naval bases and the fleet's mobile service forces provided the sustained support the carrier and amphibious striking forces needed to maintain their momentum from one island chain to the next. It was this expeditionary logistic capability, expanded to support land and air as well as naval forces, that played such a key role across the various European and Pacific beaches, in the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, and in the last battle for Okinawa.

Following the war, the Department of Defense was created, and in that department the experiences of all the armed forces were institutionalized. The new department specified the function of each of the uniformed services and delineated the relationships among them in what was to be the ideal "joint" environment. The Navy and Marine Corps were chartered to provide forces to: "seek out and destroy enemy naval forces . . . suppress [the enemy's] commerce . . . gain and maintain . . . naval supremacy . . . control vital sea areas . . . protect . . . sea lines of communications . . . seize and defend advanced naval bases, and . . . conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to . . . a naval campaign."³ In addition, the Marine Corps was assigned "primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, and equipment

. . . of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps."⁴

The *Dictionary of Military Terms* of the Joint Chiefs of Staff defines an amphibious operation as "an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft, involving a landing on a hostile shore."⁵ Joint doctrine on the subject tells us that "the salient requirement of the amphibious operation is the necessity of building up combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack drives toward the final objectives."⁶ These official statements invoke images of World War II. But except for those few still in service who had firsthand experience in such operations 30 or more years ago (Inchon in 1950 was the last of this genre), officers can find these images now only in history books or old movies.

Many things have changed since Normandy and Okinawa. Because of nuclear weapons, tacticians of all kinds have had to find ways to reduce the vulnerability of military units while still retaining their capability to concentrate rapidly at a critical time and place. The solution seems to be to disperse the elements of a force while providing them with the

tactical mobility they need to achieve combat power superior to the enemy's at the point of decision. Mechanized and air-mobile (helicopter) formations have much more of this capability than did the formations of World War II. In Vietnam air-mobile tactics worked well against a guerrilla foe. But new weapons raise questions about the future viability of both helicopter-borne and mechanized maneuver elements. Meantime, technology, as always, affects logistics as much as it does tactics.

With greater firepower, improved tactical mobility, and better command and control than any of their predecessors, today's ground and air forces also need much more logistic support, in the form of supplies, maintenance, and transportation, than their predecessors did. But then modern technology has improved the services' ability to provide themselves with this support. Most importantly, the ships and aircraft available to transport today's forces and the supplies they require are much bigger and faster than those of World War II. Moreover, a revolutionary commercial development, containerized cargo-handling, has greatly speeded the loading and unloading of ships and airplanes. Unfortunately, we

SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT



KIRBY HARRISON

One of the few advanced bases available to the United States in the Indian Ocean is Diego Garcia. Above, we see a Seabee making his own amphibious progress across the island after a torrential rainfall. At left, cargo ships wait to unload at Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port of Jidda. The number of ships waiting and the fact that nearly all have their own cargo booms help describe the harbor facilities ashore. The contribution amphibious ships can make in circumstances such as these is plain.

have not yet been able to exploit this speed-up when we operate in an expeditionary environment. Once we do get the material ashore, modern technology can aid in the rapid construction of facilities needed for personnel support and equipment maintenance. In order to realize the full potential of all these improvements, we must recognize logistic support for what it is—a necessary and integral part of any force's operational capability.

Table 1 lists the highlights of these trends in terms of both capability and share of available naval resources allocated. The ups and downs over the period reflect the changing priorities that have been assigned by strategists and programmers.

The Current Situation

Within the past year or two this country has been attempting to adjust to a new strategic situation. In the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, far from our shores or the borders of any of our traditional allies, some of the United States' vital interests are threatened. In the great distances between key locations, the need for advanced bases, and the austere condition of most of the few man-made facilities that exist in the region, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf resemble World War II's Pacific Theater. But here, instead of being on a series of archipelagoes, all the potential tactical objectives of an amphibious force are on or near the coast of a continental land-mass. Another important difference here is that inland the terrain generally is open. These facts affect both tactics and logistics.

The biggest problems arising from this situation are the strategic imponderables. Even if solutions can be found to the problems of deploying and supporting a sizable force in a hostile environment half a world away, what will be the military objectives of such a force? Will the strategy be purely defensive or will offensive operations be required to safeguard the nation's interests? Finally, these questions, and many others, must be answered under the shadow of the Soviet threat to the oil fields from the north.

Clearly, the strategic mobility planning and the means of implementation that may be appropriate in Europe are not suitable for the Persian Gulf. A strategic mobility planner looking at Europe knows that significant U. S. and allied forces will already be in place on the continent at the outbreak of hostilities. The requirement is to strengthen these forces rapidly. This can be done best by prepositioning equipment and airlifting people. Hence, we have placed large quantities of equipment and supplies in

friendly base areas. The troops to use that equipment would be ferried from the United States by administrative airlift. After collecting their equipment, they would move overland to forward defensive positions.

In a Persian Gulf crisis there may be no friendly forces ashore near the scene of potential conflict. There is no assurance that the terminals where the troops can meet their equipment and supplies will be in friendly hands when they are needed. Therefore, we must be able to move to the region, establish the necessary base facilities (if necessary by seizing them), and then conduct whatever combat operations may be required. As to the likelihood that local allies will do some of our work for us, it is well to remember that if we have to resort to military operations it will be to secure access to oil, not to prop up some weak local government.

It is evident that amphibious assault equipment and tactics based on experience nearly forty years old in other parts of the world are inadequate for the situations likely to be encountered east of Suez in the 1980s.

Because we cannot anticipate where we may have to land, the Navy and Marine Corps should concentrate on developing and maintaining the most flexible capability possible to project landing forces ashore. This requires firstly mental flexibility in order to free planners from answers which were good solutions to problems we no longer have. Secondly, it requires the exploration and exploitation of new technology such as VSTOL aircraft, air-cushion landing craft, precision-guided weapons, and the whole range of equipment and tactics of electronic warfare as they might affect amphibious operations. Thirdly, it requires adherence to the traditional bent of the naval service to "go in harm's way," in a thoughtful and innovative manner designed to make an opponent react to our actions rather than always having to react to his.

If we go to Europe, we will most likely be going to the aid of reliable allies (or else why go?). There the tactical capability to force our way ashore probably will be less important than the expeditionary logistic capability to land without dependence on ports or airfields and to project ashore a tactically integrated, self-contained, air-ground force. For instance, the ability to support operations in extreme cold, as in Norway, is more a logistical than a tactical problem.

Landings in the Caribbean or on the shores of the South China Sea will most likely face lower levels of opposition than we might expect in Europe. If we develop them properly, the mobility of amphibious and landing forces can be exploited in such circum-

stances to land at places and times most favorable to our side. As we have already seen in two wars over the past 30 years, helicopters (and potentially VSTOL aircraft) provide better tactical mobility ashore in such rough terrain as Korea's or the jungles of South-east Asia, than do ground vehicles. But in open terrain such as one finds in the Middle East, in South-west Asia, and in Central Europe, it is probable that more mechanization will be needed than the Marines have. At least, the experiences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war point in that direction.

Because resources will always be limited, it is wrong to prepare solely for the "classical" amphibious assault landing when more often what will be needed is a landing across an uncontested beach or even through a friendly harbor. Indeed, sometimes the task will be, not the landing of major combat elements, but the evacuation of civilians in danger.

The establishment of a logical frame of reference

for the examination of alternatives is the most important part of any review of strategy and forces. We need such a framework if we are to get even approximately right answers to such emotionally charged questions as:

► What is the proper relationship between airlift and sealift in the projection of conventional forces overseas?

► How do the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the amphibious forces of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets complement each other in crisis management or combat operations?

► And how do we relate the tactics and logistics of amphibious operations to the requirements of the land and air campaigns which may begin with them?

A New Look

Let us start with Rear Admiral Henry Eccles's

Table 1 *Evolution Of U. S. Navy Amphibious Forces (1940-1980)**


<i>Date</i>	<i>Active Ships (% Fleet)</i>		<i>Ship Types</i>	<i>Lift (MAF Assault Echelon)</i>	<i>Resources</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1940	20	—	AP, AK & APD	<1	Minimal	Ships were converted passenger liners, freighters, and destroyers
1945	1728	(.40)	APA, AKA, & LST	11	Mostly operations and maintenance dollars for active ships	Reliance on WWII residual ships activated from "mothball" fleet for Korea
1950	91	(.15)	APA, AKA, & LST	<1		
1955	242	(.21)	LSD-28 & LPH	2	\$1.0B	FY 1961 budget request
1960	113	(.14)	introduced	1.75		
1965	135	(.15)	LPD & 20 Knot LST added	2.0 (program objective)	2.2B (26% of SCN)	Part of OSD's Strategic Mobility enhancement program
1969	162	(.17)		1.67 (p.o.)	\$1.5B	Start of Post-Vietnam "wind-down"
1970	118	(.14)		1.33 (p.o.)	\$1.4B	LHAs Cut from 9 to 5; high ship costs cited
1976	62	(.13)	First LHA added. Entire force 20 Knot	1.33 (p.o.)	\$1.25B	
1979	65	(.14)		1.15 (p.o.)	\$.85B	Lowest ebb since Pre-Korea
1980	60	(.13)	Last LHA delivered. LSD-41 programmed	1.15 (p.o.)	\$1.3B (8% of SCN)	Includes \$200M for Maritime Prepositioning Ships (Carter Budget)

*Data in this table are from a number of sources. The pre-World War II status of amphibious forces was gleaned from Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War* (Princeton, 1951). Numbers of active ships, fleet size, lift capacity (in terms of lift for the assault echelon of a Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF), and the approximate dates of introduction of new ship types are from Lt. Cdr. Carl Douglas, USN, "Amphibious Deficiencies—The Navy's 'Ostrich Act'," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sept. 1980. The figures were cross-checked with the *Naval Review* issues of 1975 and 1980. Program Objectives (p.o.) for amphibious lift and the resources allocated to achieve them are from annual SecDef reports to Congress and other DOD documents. All dollar figures are expressed in FY 1981 dollars of total obligational authority. Percentages of the Ship Construction, Navy (SCN) appropriation allocated to new amphibious ship construction are shown for two selected years to give an indication of how this percentage has varied over the past 15 years (it was 0% in some of the intervening years).

definition of strategy: "the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."⁷ Nowadays the overriding objective of military strategy is to deter potential enemies from taking actions harmful to one's own country and its interests. If deterrence fails, our leaders have said the United States will protect her interests, but at the lowest level and most restricted scope of violence possible. If we expect to be able both to limit the use of force and protect our interests we cannot always react defensively to an opponent's gambit. We must have an offensive capability at our disposal with which we can take the initiative in any part of the world where U. S. interests are threatened.


Consider the following hypothetical alternative to the scenario that unfolded recently. When the U. S. Embassy in Teheran was overrun in February, 1979, nine months before the hostages were seized, a combined diplomatic and military contingency plan could have been developed. Because Teheran is 345 nautical miles from the head of the Persian Gulf, an emergency evacuation like those conducted in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 would not have been feasible with the helicopters we have. So, let us imagine that arrangements were made to relocate the Embassy staff to the U. S. consulate in Khorramshahr and that in the meantime an amphibious task group (ATG) was sailed to reinforce the Navy's small Middle East Force.

All vital U. S. interests in Iran would have been consolidated in the southwestern corner of the country. Diplomatic relations could have been maintained with Iran as long as this was in our best interest but our people would have been only 55 nautical miles from protection. While the ATG would be close to the scene, the CV battle groups could be outside the Strait of Hormuz. This is more than 500 nautical miles away from Khorramshahr, no small distance, but under conceivable circumstances it would still have been possible to provide some air cover, if that



The Arabian Peninsula and its surroundings. This is a huge area of land and sea. Even so, very few of the potential advanced bases currently under discussion for use by American forces are even on the map. Mombasa, for example, is about 900 miles to the southwest of Berbera, while to fly from Berbera to Diego Garcia is to go about 1,900 miles to the southeast. From Berbera to an objective area at, say, Bandar Abbas at the Strait of Hormuz, is 1,520 miles by sea. Those are long distances to have to go back for food, fuel, ammunition, supplies, and fresh water.





PH3 GEORGE BRUDER, USN

The USNS Mercury (T-AKR 11), one of three RoRo ships now prepositioned at Diego Garcia, is shown loading military equipment at Wilmington, North Carolina, this past summer. Provided there is enough deep water alongside, she can unload herself, which is more than most American RoRo ships can do. The 19,172-ton Mercury is credited with a sustained speed of 23 knots and a radius of 10,000 miles at that speed.

were needed. In any event, this combination of amphibious force and carrier battle group would have been more responsive to the need than transport aircraft flying from sensitive foreign bases over a thousand miles away.

The critical command and control link between Washington and officials on the scene would have been provided by secure communications facilities at the consulate or aboard the flagship of Commander Middle East Force offshore. When it became obvious that the new government of Iran was unable or unwilling to protect American citizens the evacuation plan would have been implemented.

Such "Monday morning quarterbacking" is intended only as an illustration of how a combination of initiative with a good set of operational capabilities can be useful in a crisis.

One needn't confine his thoughts on this subject to small-unit deployments. As a crisis develops and the authorities in Washington deliberate, consult, and negotiate, as much amphibious shipping as necessary can be sailed to build up combat power

offshore without automatically committing the United States to a conflict. That this can be done was demonstrated during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when a full Marine division-wing team was embarked at ports on the east and west coasts, sailed to the waters off Cuba, maintained there for a month, and without ever being committed ashore, returned to its various ports of embarkation.

If Washington decides to land the landing force, the time and place of landing can be chosen to exploit weaknesses in the enemy's dispositions and avoid his strong points. There are over 1,000 miles of continental coastline around the Persian Gulf alone, and most of them are usable by modern landing craft (helicopters and air cushion vehicles). But to realize the full potential of the mobility of an amphibious task force, the embarked landing force must have adequate tactical mobility once ashore and the whole force must have enough logistic support so that for a fairly long period it can be independent of established ports and airfields. (Keep in mind that the port of Cherbourg was not available to support the Allied landing forces until almost three months after D-Day in Normandy; until then the invading armies were supplied over the beach.) More will be said of these interrelated capabilities later.

Finally, amphibious forces of the fleet complement the much-publicized RDF in ways that can make the latter a force of real utility. If necessary, the airfields and ports needed to unload MAC transports and maritime prepositioning ships can be seized by amphibious operations. The landing force put ashore can secure the marshaling areas, which must be large enough for the tens of thousands of air-transported


troops to find and make ready their heavy equipment and supplies, and to reorganize themselves into tactical formations. And the amphibious force's ships, craft, and helicopters can help in the subsequent local transportation of units from wherever they join their equipment to wherever they are needed tactically. It is evident that the sea, air, and land forces of a balanced fleet with its own integrated command and control system meet the necessary—and may satisfy the sufficient—conditions needed to control a particular crisis. There is a good chance no additional force need be applied. If more force is needed, elements of the RDF deploying safely into the permissive environment created by landing forces already on the scene can reinforce the latter.

As much sense as this view of amphibious operations makes, and after nearly forty years of repeated demonstrations of their utility, amphibious forces still have difficulty getting 10 to 15 percent of the resources allocated to similar forces by the Defense Department.⁸ Only an institutional change can improve this situation. The solution can be found in the arrangements enjoyed by airlift within DOD, which have yielded great success in the continuing competition for resources. The commander of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) should be elevated to the status of a Specified Commander, coequal with Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CinCMAC). With the rank and staff appropriate to his new status he would also be given the responsibility

for planning and controlling the employment of all of our national sealift assets—not only the U. S. naval ships currently operated by MSC, and chartered U. S.-flag merchantmen, but also all amphibious shipping. That officer would become the focal point of matters relating to the support and continued development of this national capability. What is good for one of our two means of projecting forces overseas should be good for the other.

The Commander in Chief Military Sealift Command (CinCMSC) would still report to the CNO and SecNav, just as his counterpart, CinCMAC, answers to his service chief and department head. Active amphibious ships would continue to be assigned to the operational control of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. Existing relations between the Navy and Marine Corps within the Navy Department would not change. What would change would be the visibility of, and therefore the attention given to, this critical element of our strategic mobility. Effective, efficient solutions to a wide range of sealift problems could be pursued in a coordinated way without doing excessive violence to the amphibious warfare doctrine developed in World War II. (To bring it up to date the old doctrine needs to suffer some violence. As long as we develop new ways and means of carrying out likely future amphibious missions, the violence will not be "excessive.") But most important, decision-makers at the highest levels of government would have the benefit of a comprehensive and balanced exposition of the ways and means of projecting U. S. power overseas in support of national strategic objectives.

PH1 A. J. RINGUETTE, USN



Results of New Look

Let us examine the ability of our amphibious forces to maintain a military presence where we have no troops ashore. Before the Vietnam War there were four amphibious task units deployed forward

A common sight of our times: the rescue of civilian refugees from an unsafe place by an amphibious ship. In this case the place was Beirut, Lebanon, the time was June 1976, and the rescue ship awaiting the refugees crowded aboard an LCU was the old Spiegel Grove (LSD 32). By boat, people can be rescued from seaports or beaches. By helo they can be reached nearly 100 miles inland. A future VSTOL transport could reach nearly 500 miles inland, which might have made possible a rescue at Teberan.


continuously—one in the Mediterranean, two in the Western Pacific, and one in the Caribbean. Because of our declining amphibious strength, the Caribbean deployment long ago became an “occasional” rather than a continuously maintained station. The current Arabian Sea deployment is carried out on a port-and-starboard basis, alternating the Mediterranean amphibious task unit with the one ATU in the Western Pacific that has the ability to conduct a vertical envelopment.

Considering both the uncertain future and our many years of successful crisis management (such as the landing in Lebanon in 1958, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the recapture of the *Mayaguez* in 1975), it appears as if four forward-deployed amphibious task units is a prudent compromise between assuming the role of world policeman and abandoning the government’s responsibility to protect its citizens overseas. The most likely missions of these units are to show the flag, to assist in the management of crises, and to evacuate U. S. nationals in emergencies. Their task organization should reflect the operational requirements of these missions. The ships should be reasonably habitable and should have good sea-keeping characteristics, for they will make long deployments. They should have secure communication links with headquarters around the world

and adequate flag spaces so an embarked staff can work efficiently. And since the embarked landing force will depend primarily on helicopters or VSTOL aircraft for ship-to-shore movement in their most likely missions, these ships should be able to operate and support significant numbers of these types of aircraft.

To exploit the tactical mobility of the helicopter, the landing force units would necessarily be “light,” just as they are now with, for mobility on the ground, a small number of helicopter-transportable vehicles and, for fire support ashore, a few artillery pieces. If they are properly trained and equipped, such light, helicopter-borne infantry units are most useful for limited-objective offensive and defensive missions such as the counter-terrorist raids at Entebbe or Mogadiscio and the protection of embassies. In larger operations, such units are useful for deep reconnaissance and security missions. Currently, assuming the presence of the large CH-53D helicopter, which has a radius of 97 nautical miles, the umbrella of protection offered by sea-based air-mobile units can be provided to about three quarters of the Americans living and working abroad. When the operating forces get aircraft like the VSTOL-A prototype, which has twice the speed of a CH-53D and a radius of 475 nautical miles, the umbrella can be extended to over 90 percent of the locations where American citizens can be found overseas.⁹

The combined mission needs of the amphibious task unit and its embarked Marine amphibious unit could be satisfied by a deployment unit, or DU, of two ships of modern design like the LHA and the LSD-41. Four such DUs of two ships each would add up to eight ships forward deployed at all times. This would provide better worldwide presence and respon-




TEXTRON

Two kinds of landing craft enter the well decks of LSDs. Above, the Jeff-B air cushion vehicle, or LCAC, enters the Spiegel Grove while, at right, an LCU enters the Pensacola. Even when LCACs become common, it will be useful to employ conventional landing craft because of their great economy and carrying capacity. The LCU and LCAC take up about the same space inside the ship but, while the LCU has only about a quarter of the air cushion vehicle's speed, she can carry about three times the load.



PH1 JOHN SHEPPARD, USN



PHC KEN GEORGE, USN

siveness to crises than our current forward deployments of 14 to 16 ships out of a total force of about 65 amphibious ships (some of which are partly manned by naval reservists), and could be maintained by an amphibious force of 32 ships, or approximately one-half the size of our present force.

When the need arises to reinforce U. S. presence near the scene of a crisis, the surge capability of the amphibious force becomes important. The much smaller active force described above still has a significant surge capability provided it is composed of ships of modern design. Assuming that 15 percent of the force would be unavailable as a result of extended overhauls in progress, at least 20 ships would be immediately available to respond without drawing down on forward deployments outside the area of crisis. A force of this size could be assembled near a trouble spot in Southwest Asia within a few weeks and it could have embarked the combat power of a Marine amphibious brigade, or MAB. The brigade could consist of as many as 20,000 troops (a large number of whom would be aviation support specialists) and over 300 aircraft. The aircraft complement could include both helicopters and tactical aircraft like the advanced Harrier, task organized for the mission at hand.

But even such a formidable force offshore could not be expected to "go it alone" if major combat operations were anticipated. First of all, any large

The ideal deployment unit will consist of an LSD combined with one of the big new LHAs, such as the Tarawa (LHA 1), pictured here off Mindoro in the Philippines this past November. Notice the CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters on the flight deck, along with four Harrier AV-8A attack planes (one of them airborne). The ship's stern gate is open, permitting landing craft of all kinds and varieties to enter and leave. The tactical potential of such a deployment unit is great.

scale activities would most likely be joint-service affairs and the forces involved would have to be assured of adequate operating and support bases. Facilities at Diego Garcia would be used to the utmost but they are not all that large and they are over 2,000 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz. Ports and airfields such as at Muscat, Oman (755 nautical miles to Khorramshahr, 200 to Bandar Abbas, by sea); Masirah Island (450 miles to Bandar Abbas by air); Berbera, Somalia (1,520 miles to Bandar Abbas by sea); and Mombasa, Kenya (2,520 miles to Bandar Abbas by sea); might be available in an emergency. But we must have more than last-minute approval to use existing facilities if we are to provide a large joint force with adequate logistic support. The concurrent combat operations of one hundred or more naval combatants, half as many amphibious ships and aux-

iliaries, over 600 land- and sea-based tactical aircraft, and up to three divisions, or over 150,000 troops, ashore, would require a major logistic support effort.

The Navy and Marines are working now to improve the logistic support of tactical units in an expeditionary environment. The program, labeled Amphibious Logistic Support Ashore (ALSA),¹⁰ is intended to use modern technology, such as containers and rigid shelters, to provide support to a landing force until more nearly permanent facilities can be developed. By expanding and adapting this program to meet additional mission needs, the requirement for advanced bases in the early phases of any joint operation can also be satisfied. The success or failure of this effort could have more impact on the outcome of a campaign than the results of any single, dramatic engagement between opposing tactical units.

ALSA consists of two complementary systems. The Navy's contribution is the Amphibious Logistic System (ALS). It consists of both equipment and techniques for unloading containerized cargo, vehicles, and bulk fuel from modern merchantmen in the absence of port facilities, in harbors if possible, off un-

protected beaches if necessary. The equipment includes such new items as a crane able to reach up to 150 feet while lifting 35 tons. This can be mounted on the deck of one ship to unload a non-self-sustaining container ship (CONT/N) alongside. (It is useful to think of a fully loaded 20-foot container as weighing about 22 tons and a 40-foot container as weighing about 33½ tons.) Also under development are self-propelled and elevatable causeways, and rubber bladders that can store 135,000 gallons of fuel afloat or ashore. By integrating new and existing equipment, ALS is designed to move dry and liquid cargo from ships offshore to the beach, where the other part of the program, the Marine Corps' Field Logistic System takes over.

Using specialized materials-handling equipment, a family of commercially designed vehicles, and the pipelines of the existing amphibious assault fuel system, the field logistic system moves cargo inland, to where it is needed. A variety of container inserts have been designed for the packaging of supplies in boxes, some of which can be handled easily by two men. In addition to the transportation of supplies, the field




PH1 CARL R. BEGY, USN

Helicopter-borne troops have great mobility while in the air. But, once they are on the ground, they have little tactical maneuverability, especially in open terrain, for while the men can be flown easily, their vehicles cannot. These Marines are returning to their CH-46 helicopters after an exercise on Molokai, an island just east of Oahu in the Hawaiian chain.

logistic system provides shelters of various sizes for the performance of necessary personnel-support and equipment-maintenance functions. They are all dimensionally standardized so that the components of the largest shelters can be transported within the space occupied by 20-foot or 40-foot commercial containers.

Currently ALSA is being developed to support a Marine Amphibious Force. This force, numbering about 50,000, consists of a reinforced division, about



The Jeff-B air cushion landing craft in a rough sea. Unlike conventional landing craft, this one can operate over land and, unlike helicopters, can carry heavy equipment, such as tanks. By means of such craft, vast areas of coastline formerly safe from amphibious attack will be opened up to naval exploitation.

120 tactical aircraft, and combat service support for up to 30 days of independent operations. The daily resupply requirements amount to some 1,500 short tons of dry cargo and 15,000 bbls. (about 2,000 short tons) of bulk POL. If fresh water is added to the resupply requirements, as it certainly would be in most of Southwest Asia, as much as 50 gallons per man per day would have to be drilled, distilled, or transported. That is 2.5 million gallons, or 10,000 tons, daily.

To put these numbers in perspective it is worth noting that a single containership of the SL-7 design carries about 1,000 containers, or 22,000 tons. A 40,000-ton tanker carries about 300,000 bbls. of POL products. A single elevated causeway can transfer 200 containers (each with a payload of 20 tons, or 4,000 tons total) per day, and the Amphibious Logistic System can move 24,000 bbls. of bulk fuel to consumers ashore each day. These figures demonstrate that when developed, ALSA will have significant growth potential to support much larger forces in an expeditionary environment. Once logistically supportable courses of action are assured by the existence of suitable advanced bases, operational planners can consider their tactical options.

Modern technology assures us that future amphibious operations against a continental landmass will be very different from those of World War II, whether they occur in Europe or elsewhere. Especially where there are large, open, and lightly held areas behind the coastline, maneuver promises to play a bigger part in tactics than it did in the frontal assaults and battles of attrition that characterized the landings at Tarawa, Pelelieu, Salerno, and Anzio. Inside of 24 hours, an amphibious task force steaming parallel to a hostile shore can cover a distance equal to that from Boston to Washington, D.C. Theater and fleet cover and deception operations can confuse the enemy as to the exact location of a landing until after the buildup ashore is well underway. The initial elements, consisting of reconnaissance and "light infantry" units, can be disembarked from amphibious ships while the latter are still underway and over the horizon from the selected landing site. Helicopters, VSTOL aircraft, and air-cushion landing craft (LCAC),

can deliver these troops to unoccupied or lightly held terrain deep inland. Provided they have adequate tactical mobility once on the ground, these forces can carry out the tasks once performed by the cavalry, screening the main force, acting as a covering force for the landing, conducting raids and ambushes to unbalance the enemy, and performing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition missions for long-range air and missile systems.

Though we still have no VSTOL transports, we will get some if and when the Navy's VSTOL-A program gets off the ground. As we have seen, VSTOL aircraft generally have much longer ranges and higher speeds than helicopters do, even while carrying the same payloads. A tilt-rotor prototype such as the XV-15 would carry the same load as the present CH-46 and occupy no more deck area aboard ship. Such a VSTOL transport would be more expensive than current helicopters are because it involves new technology, and it would take ten to fifteen years to get a significant operational capability in the fleet. But since our current helicopters are reaching the end of their useful lives, the question is whether we should invest in new technology or old for their replacements.

Though we now have only two experimental air cushion landing craft (JEFF-A and JEFF-B), the Soviets have over 40 such craft, some of them quite a bit larger than those we are considering. The notional 88-foot LCAC the Marines are using for their studies has the following characteristics compared to conventional landing craft:

	LCM-6	LCM-8	LCU	LCAC
Length	56'	74'	135'	88'
Beam	14'	21'	29'	47'
"Spotting factor"	1.0	1.98	5.0	5.3
Speed	9 kts.	9-12 kts.	11 kts.	35-50 kts.
Cargo area	37'x11'	45'x15'	124'x16'	67'x27'
Cargo capacity	34 tons	65 tons	188 tons	60-75 tons
Medium tank capacity	0	1	3	1

The LCACs would be launched from amphibious ships steaming some 25 miles or more from the landing sites. After crossing the coastline they would

proceed inland along previously reconnoitered routes to near their initial objectives. Then the tanks and other combat vehicles would be disembarked. Obviously, the most efficient ship-to-shore force would be some mix of air and surface craft with the high performance, high cost elements kept to the minimum required to support the scheme of maneuver ashore. The balance of the lighterage requirement could be met by more economical conventional landing craft and LASH or Seabee barges. The optimum mix, of course, would depend on the conditions and circumstances of each individual operation. Consequently, what the services must try for are generally efficient solutions that can serve effectively over a range of missions and situations, rather than optimum solutions for a small number of narrowly conceived events.

It is because of these improved ship-to-shore capabilities and better means of reconnaissance that the first-wave maneuver elements can seize critically important objectives virtually unopposed before the defenders start to react to the landing. Then, as the enemy's armored columns move toward the landing area, long-range weapon systems guided by small, mobile target acquisition teams on the ground can delay, disorganize, and weaken them. In the time gained by tactical surprise and the depth of the initial landings, and while the enemy prepares to mount his counterattack, heavier combat and support units can be put ashore by conventional landing craft and by the lighters serving self-sustaining commercial containerhips (CONT/S). This two-sided buildup of combat power in the vicinity of the beachhead thus becomes a race between the opposing forces.

Table 2 *Amphibious Force Capabilities By The Year 2001**

Ship	No.	Troops	Vehicles	Cargo	POL	Helos	Ldg. Cft.	Remarks
FORWARD DEPLOYMENT UNIT (DU)								
LHA/LHDX	1	1,800	25Kft ²	120Kft ³	2,200bbls	38	26	4 DUs on Station
LSD-36/41	1	400	12K	12K	800	3	12	Continuously Worldwide
<i>Totals</i>	2	2,200	37Kft ²	132Kft ³	3,000bbls	41	38	
SURGE CAPABILITY								
LHA/LHDX	9	16,200	225Kft ²	1080Kft ³	19,800bbls	342	234	Capability to mass at a single crisis location without draw-down of three other forward deployments
LSD-36/41/LST	11	4,400	145K	90K	50,200	18	76	
<i>Totals</i>	20	20,600	370Kft ²	1170Kft ³	70,000bbls	360	310	
TOTAL MAF LIFT								
LHA/LHDX	14	25,200	350Kft ²	1680Kft ³	30.8Kbbls	532	364	Based on Retire/Replace Plan Shown in Table 3.
LSD-36/41	11	4,400	132K	120K	8.8K	33	132	
LST	6	2,400	90K	24K	56.4K	6	—	
RO/RO	9	—	1575K	—	—	—	—	
CONT/N/S	9	28,000	—	3400K	—	—	100	7 CONT/N Configured as AP, 4000 PAX ea. 2 CONT/S with 50 lighters ea.
AO	4	—	—	—	1,200K	—	—	Not Part of Amphib. Ship plan
<i>Totals</i>	53	60,000	2.15Mft ²	5.2Mft ³	1.3Mbbls	571	596	
% MAF		1.2	1.4	1.7	2.2	1.6	1.7	
(1 MAF)		(50,000)	(1.5 Mft ²)	(3.0 Mft ³)	(600K bbls)	(350 CH-46)	(350 LCM-6)	Current norm, may change with changes in weapons, equipment & tactics

*Ship characteristics shown in this table are approximations taken from a variety of unclassified sources. The MAF defined in terms of its lift "footprint" is a notional task organization such as that used at the Marine Corps Education Center. The values of its dimensions are also approximations.

The roll-on, roll-off ships, containerhips, and tankers shown under "Total MAF Lift" could be manned by civilian contract crews under the Military Sealift Command, by full regular Navy crews, or by nucleus regular Navy crews who could be augmented rapidly by personnel from shore stations or by naval reservists. In any major contingency, whether the action takes place in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or anywhere else, additional ships, taken from commercial use, would be needed.

Table 3 *Amphibious Ship Retirement And Replacement Plan (1981-2001)**

Type	No.	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01		
LSD-28	8			-1	-3	-2	-2																
LPH	7										-1	-1	-1		-1	-1				-1	-1		
LPD	15											-1	-1	-1	-2	-1	-2			-2	-2	-3	
LSD-36	5																			-1		-2	
LST	20																				-1	-7	-6
LHA	5																						
<i>Total</i>	60																						
LSD-41	(New)			+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
LHDX	(Constr.)				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1
RO/RO				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
CONT/N/S				+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1		+1	
Net:																							
Du	12			12	13	13	14	14	15	15	15	14	14	14	14	13	14	14	14	14	13	14	
Ships	60			62	60	61	60	63	64	67	67	68	67	69	67	68	67	70	66	59	49		

Resource Summary (FY 1981 Dollars)

SCN (Incl. investment for LCAC & ALS) = \$720M/YR. (12% of the total SCN appropriation)
 (45% Sealift TOA compared to 1962-1981 Avg. of investment-to-TOA of 48% Airlift, 36% Sealift)

Sealift (Amphibs. + Merships) TOA = \$1.6B/YR (40% of the Mobility Forces TOA compared to 20Yr Avg. of 34%)

Projection Forces TOA Mobility Forces = \$4.0B/YR (Compared to 20 yr. Avg. of \$4.1B, FY 1981 Program of \$3.6B, FY81-85 Estimate of \$4.25B/YR)

M = Millions ALS = Amphibious logistic system
 B = Billions TOA = Total obligational authority
 SCN = Ship Construction, Navy Avg = Average
 LCAC = Loading craft, air cushion

*The schedule of ship retirements is that published by Headquarters Marine Corps. The proposed new construction schedule is designed to maintain between 12 and 16 deployment units, keep the total force at least at its current strength, and accomplish both objectives at the level of resource allocation shown in the resource summary. Unit costs used to arrive at these estimates are: LSD-41-\$350M, LHDX-\$700M, RO/RO and CONT/N/S-\$185M each. In the years that an LHDX is procured, \$20M is available for investment in LCAC and ALS components. The two years that show no ship acquisitions (1982 and '83) are left blank to allow for startup time, but the resources they represent (about \$1.5B in investment) can be applied to programs like LCAC and ALS that are ready for quantity production now. Perfectly level funding profiles neither could nor should be maintained over twenty years, and other management actions would be necessary before we could achieve a ratio of sealift investment to operating expenses of .45-to-.55, but this is not a detailed procurement program ready for implementation. It is intended to stimulate informed discussion.

Neither LCCs nor LKAs are shown on this table.

The LCCs are already being used as fleet flagships. If we mount a major amphibious operation in either ocean area, at least one of these ships would probably be on the scene anyway. For lesser operations, the C³I requirements can probably be met by building equipment into the ships used for the regular sustained deployments. The same capabilities needed for crisis management can be designed to support amphibious operations.

Even now the LKAs, all of which are partly manned by reservists, are unavailable to us on short notice. Since essentially they are break-bulk cargo ships, they are less critical to the total amphibious capability than ships with a large vehicle square or aviation capacity. So long as the ALSA capability is developed, by the year 2001 the cargo requirements can be satisfied by containerhips.

The numbers in the horizontal line, DU, show how many such deployment units we would have in each year of the transition period. The current number, 12, is based on possession of 7 LPH and 5 LHA, allowing one aviation-capable ship for each DU. There are enough other ships to satisfy the LSD requirement, which is also for one such ship in each DU. Over the years we never quite reach the number 16 needed to support four DUs on station at the 4:1 ratio. We also never quite get down to the 32-ship level (16 LHDX and 16 LSD-41) because by 2001 we will still have two LSD-36 class and six LSTs in the force. The 18 merchant ships (RO/RO and containerhips) are intended to make up the balance of the sealift force in a more economical way than trying to replace our current amphibious ships, when they wear out, on a one-for-one basis.

The advantage will likely go to that force which has gained the initiative, i.e., the landing force, provided it can maintain its momentum.

The elements needed to implement this tactical concept are already to be found in our land and tactical air forces. Helicopter-borne forces are best suited for the development and defense of strong points in open terrain because of their limited tactical mobility once they are on the ground. When the terrain is too rough for armored warfare airmobile infantry units can be used as maneuver elements, provided they can maintain tactical mobility superior to the enemy's. An example of such employment might be the use of helicopter-borne ski troops in Norway.

But for offensive operations in Southwest Asia, a landing force needs to be able to form mechanized, combined-arms task forces. These units can be carried by air cushion landing craft across any flat stretch of coastline, and moved inland along such avenues as rivers and salt flats. Carrying a 60-ton tank at 50 knots, the current JEFF-B has an endurance of four hours in sea state 2. If the technology of light armored vehicles is combined with this revolutionary landing craft even greater tactical advantages can be realized.

The aviation combat element of the landing force must also be specially configured if it is to be fully "mission capable." It should be seen for what it is—the landward extension of naval aviation. At times it will be the only tactical aviation available to support ground units. At other times it may be needed to support the operations of other fleet units in adjacent seas. Because of these diverse mission requirements, landing force aviation should possess the full range of air support capabilities, from anti-air warfare to close air support of ground units. It should also be able to operate from the decks of amphibious ships and from expeditionary bases ashore. To achieve this flexibility and minimize its dependence on established air bases, VSTOL technology should be pushed to the utmost in the re-equipping and modernization of landing force aviation.

All these proposed changes in equipment and doctrine will ultimately result in changes in amphibious lift and ship-to-shore movement requirements. Table 2 summarizes what our active amphibious force, including immediately available merchant ships, might look like in the year 2001 if the ideas that have been discussed so far are acted upon. The LHDX designation (called the LXA in some studies) is used as an example of something on the drawing boards that could be modified to support the concepts developed. The RO/RO and containership designs referred to are current commercial capabilities. They could be

Table 4 *Using the Suez Canal*

<i>From</i>	<i>Closure Time in Days</i>	<i>Cumulative Force (DWT)</i>
Mid-Mediterranean (1/9)	10	1/9
Okinawa (2/9)	18	3/9
Norfolk (3/9)	24	6/9
San Diego (3/9)	31	9/9

Not Using the Suez Canal

<i>From</i>	<i>Closure Time in Days</i>	<i>Cumulative Force (DWT)</i>
Okinawa (2/9)	18	2/9
Mid-Mediterranean (1/9)	26	3/9
San Diego (3/9)	31	6/9
Norfolk (3/9)	32	9/9

If we assume it takes four days to embark a MAB-size force at Norfolk, San Diego, or Okinawa, and if we assume an 18-knot speed of advance, a division-wing team can be placed at Al Basrah, Iraq, at the head of the Persian Gulf in 31 days using the Suez Canal. Without the use of the canal, the task would take 32 days.

"navalized" for a modest cost and could be converted to different uses by the application of new technology (e.g. containerized shelter technology combined with a 28,800-ton, 33-knot SL-7 equals an AP with a capacity of 4,000 passengers). Table 2 represents only one of several possible combinations. Evolution in landing force weapons and tactics might lead to different results. Change is necessary, desirable, and inevitable. Will it be rational and orderly, or not?

In an attempt to demonstrate that the changes proposed could be accomplished in an orderly and deliberately planned way over the next twenty years, I have developed the amphibious ship retirement and replacement plan shown in Table 3. This plan is based on the anticipated retirement of our current ships as each reaches the end of thirty years' service. Its objective is to maintain our ability to lift and project combat forces ashore, and to do it at a reasonable cost. If the Defense Department and the Congress are convinced that the nation needs the kind of capabilities discussed in this essay, the comparisons show this can be done.

Conclusion

In the four centuries since Drake attacked the Spanish base at Santo Domingo, amphibious warfare has been both the ultimate offensive application of sea power and a useful operational capability with which to support a strategically defensive campaign. Over the past four decades it is apparent that World

War II experience has strongly influenced our impressions on the subject.

My aim has been to suggest a different way of looking at the need for and the problems of getting a landing force ashore—a way that would make more sense to civilian policymakers than the current rationale used in amphibious force planning. That rationale, to be able to lift a full Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF, for a classical assault, has resulted over the years in amphibious lift dropping from enough to lift 2 MAFs to barely enough to lift only the assault echelon of 1.15 MAF. In this age of deterrence, the maintenance and continued development of the ability to take a variety of military initiatives against an opponent is the modern equivalent of that traditional principle of war, the offensive. This is a different principle than that upon which the RDF is based, and the tactical and logistical capabilities of airlifted and sealifted projection forces clearly reflect this difference in principle.

While the RDF depends upon speed of movement to reception facilities under friendly control, so as to respond rapidly to a friendly government's invitation to intervene, amphibious forces are trained, organized, and equipped to seize control of and hold reception areas or any other facilities that may be needed in an objective area. For their responsiveness, the latter depend on early deployment to, and the ability to loiter near, a trouble spot. It is obvious that these qualities are complementary. By airlifting troops, we can move a light airborne division with about five days of supplies from the United States to Southwest Asia and do it in two weeks. At the end of those two weeks, the first troops to arrive will have had to be resupplied twice with food and water. If heavier units and fuel, ammunition, and water for combat operations are required, they will probably have to be transported by ship. Moreover, after the troops have gotten themselves sorted out and reconfigured into tactical organizations, they may depend on ships or landing craft to get them to where they are really needed. A seaborne force with thirty days of sustaining supplies can move to the same area in twice the time. (See Table 4.) Both forces would need the support of advanced bases and secure shipping routes if they had to engage in combat. Because they are complementary, both projection capabilities should receive balanced consideration by strategists and programmers.

But in a big bureaucracy like DOD the competition for limited resources often muddies the waters of rational decision-making. To ensure that the consideration is balanced, related and complementary mission capabilities need advocates of comparable stature and

"clout" within the bureaucracy. This is why the Commander, Military Sealift Command, should be a specified commander coequal with CinCMAC. He would act as the advocate of all our national sealift programs—amphibious, USNS, and privately owned U. S.-flag merchant shipping.

The mission is a naval mission—both traditional and newly urgent. If we let it slide, in twenty years our capability will dwindle to less than half of what it now is. But if we act with intelligence and vigor, we can have a powerful, versatile, and mobile force, all at a price far less than we will have to pay if we try to get by in some other way. The naval service owes it to the maritime nation it serves.

The time for action is now.



¹West, "A Fleet for the Year 2000", U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1980, p. 75.

²Krulak, "The U. S. Marine Corps," U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1980, p. 102.

³DOD Instr. 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense," 1958. ⁴*Ibid.*

⁵JCS Pub. 1, *Dictionary of Military Terms*, 1974.

⁶NWP-22 (B), *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, 1967, p. 1-3.

⁷This definition of strategy and its relation to tactics and logistics is taken from Henry Eccles' treatment of the same subjects in *Military Power in a Free Society* (Naval War College, 1979), pp. 61-73.)

⁸The estimate of resources allocated to amphibious warfare capabilities is based on the following approximate values of 20 year averages of annual TOA in FY 1981 dollars.

<i>Total DOD</i>		<i>Amphibious "System" only</i>	
Land forces (divisions)		USMC division	
plus land-based tactical aviation	≈ \$30B	forces plus tactical aviation	≈ \$3B
Mobility forces (airlift, sealift & amphibious forces)	≈ 4B	Amphibious forces & sealift	≈ 1.4B
Total	\$34B	Total	4.4B (13%)

⁹Estimates based on data contained in Millard & Grike, *Amphibious Force Capabilities for Non-Combatant Emergency Evacuation (NEMVAC) Operations* (Center for Naval Analyses, Jan. 1979).

¹⁰The description of ALSA which follows is taken from a briefing prepared by HQMC (Code LM) and NAVFAC (Code 032) in August 1977 and updated in July 1979. Logistic planning factors are from FM 101-10-1, *Staff Officers' Field Manual. Organizational, Technical and Logistic Data* (Dept of the Army, July 1976).

